Mine Action Problems and Predictions
The blast pressure of rhe fuel air gas
mixture is sufficient to set off the functi onal PMN and PMD6 mines used, but
not rhe PMN2, which is blast protected.
Due to the fas t movement of the PMN2
pressure plate during the blast, we found
the shall ow-bu ried mines wou ld jump
out of the ground, making rhem visibl e.
Over most o f rhe area being
demined, the active mines were detonated
by steel wheels and dragged di sc-rollers.
As a check, the bulldozers would push
the soil and dead min es in to heaps of
earrh that were sieved mechani cally to
lim it what we missed. A t that poim in
time (1992) , all that the contract required
was a safe surface to work on for the pylon repai r crews, so only fun ctional mines
had to be removed, while UXO and dead
mines under the surface were acceptable. Our
crew played soccer on the svvept areas to
prove that no active mines were left behind.
A similar pattern appears after the
normal steel wheel and disc rollers had
passed. T he gaps in the pattern showed
where a duff mine was to be found and
the deminers then simply destroyed it.
For clearing military-laid mineflelds this
pattern is the big advamage of rolle rs as
opposed to flails or tiller mach ines. The
latter leave no such patterns and move
around the mines that are not neutralised.
Using a backup detection array is also an
adva ntage or even a necessity.
•

There are m any in th e de mining
commun ity who have nor really caught
on to the South African approach of using MRV's li ke Casspir, Buffalo or Wolves
linked to Steel Wheels and Rollers ro
detona te mines while flanening and removing vegetation. Putting in a machine
rhar breaks and spreads the mines, the
pieces of w hich you must later locate,
does no r support the appro ach . The
c hoi ce of starring with a flail or tiller as
the first step in bringing technology to
min e clearance, as is happening ar
p resent, is coumerproducrive for several
reasons. It will make the use of dogs and
other detection prin ciples a problem.
Broken pieces of TNT mix into rhe soi l,
making the use of dogs and orher vapour
det ecto rs dubious. T ech niques like
Ground Penetrating Radar (CPR) also
need the mines to be intact and upright,
and the soil to be uniform without air
gaps in it. Also, moving the surface shrapnel into the ground makes using selectivity in m etal detection more difflculr
to do. Now back to rhe example.
The total area cleared was 96,000
square meters, cleared in fi ve weeks by
seven me n operating the machines and
gas. One man was hurt on the bulldozer
when he re moved the visor of rhe bomb
suit he was wearin g because of the hear.
This bomb suit and helmet was used
by the driver of the bulldozer. The hel-

Steel Wheel Casspir
pulling Disc Rollers
detonating AP mines.
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m et and visor are considerably stronger
than rh e types used by deminers. T hese
can stop the shrapnel of a Val mara jumping mine at a distance of on e meter. This
pre-fragmented sh rapnel is equivalent to
that of a PROM I. The only problem
with the suit is that the price is $8,000
(U.S.) for the helmet alone! A pellet from
a jumping mine had gotten between the
driver's head and the helmet, grazing his
head and drawing blood. He was lucky.
The UN statistical figures for re moving
12,000 mines show that we should have
had at least six casualties, two of which
could have been fatal.
The cost was $134,000, or$ 1.40 per
square meter and nine cents fo r each mine
destroyed; 450 square meters were cleared
per man per day. During later comracts
where we wo rked unde r UN standards
and then had ro also lift UXO and dead
mines, the figures changed with rhe addition of manual demining reams who
could work on such flat and foot "safe"
ground at a rare of300 square meters per
man per day-up to 15 times faster than
normal for working in virgin min e
fields-so ir only raised the cost to $1.50
per square meter. In this first example,
technology proved its value by removing
vegetation and providing foot-safe ground.
Another example occurred in 1996,
during the UNAVEM III contract in
Ango la, when 4 ,880 km of road was
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cleared to a width of seven meters in o ne
year fo r $6.5 million. We clea red 215
mines consisting of improvised AT mines,
normal AT mines and AP mines in rhe
shoulders of the road and abutments of
the bridges. A further 802 elements of
UXO were uncovered. We used a total of
70 men, most of whom were manual
deminers hired from a Zimbabwean and
a British demining company. They were
supported by 24 Cassp irs and two C hubby
systems run by South Africans and Angolans.
A very important component of th e
team was the eight mine detecting dogs
(MODs) of the American subcontractor
and the 20 South African dogs, half of
which were used at Cabango in Angola
while the others were sent to Preroria ro
run the detection component of the Remote Explosive Sensin g Tech niques
(REST) system we were usi ng for detecting low- and no-metal mines whil e doing QA behind the manual deminers. T he
REST system did the area reduction , with
the dogs searching out low metal conten t
mines. They found three no-metal mines
that rhe handheld detectors missed co mpletely. The dogs held rhe key to the speed
and cost advantages achieved in the co ntract, thus proving their worth in HD.
The total area cleared was
34,160,000 square meters (3,4 16 hectares or 8,440 acres), so the clearance was
done at 19 cents per square meter (a third
of the cost of normal manual demi ning),
with 1,500 square meters cleared per man

per day (at least fo ur times
quicker than usual for manual
demining).
Today, other demining groups that
do nor use REST question locals and
study other informatio n avai lable to do
the area reduction . In Angola, this would
be foolhard y because AT mines need a
veh icl e wheel ro trigger th eir firin g
mechanisms, and the vehicles using the
road s were never using the full seve nmeter width. On the contrary, they were
o ft en carefully using two-wheel tracks
weaving down the center of the wide
road. Furthermore, at least half a dozen
groups were laying mines at various stages
of rhe war, so information from those
sources was not to be trusted even if it
was available. T he REST system has a
scientific basis and has proved to be quite
reliable over the course of more than
7,000 km of road contracts. Norwegian
People's Aid (NPA) is presently using
REST in Angola for road clearance and
have found that they can speed up their
operation considerably by doing so.
A third example concerns a contract
done in 1998 in southern Mozambique.
In this con tract, we cleared 1.6 million
square m eters in less than six months usin g 28 deminers, removing 5,400 mines
in the process. The pricing was distorted
because the con tract included training
d ogs, handlers and ad vanced dern ining
managers for the local Mine Action Center (MAC) as a separate effo rt in the con-
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(Left} The Casspir bomb arm with discs
sweeping AP mines.
(Below) AP mine blast pattern after a
Bomb Arm with Discs, sweep.

tract. In a separate calculation, the pricing for the actual demining worked out
at 38 cents per square meter. This was ar
least half the go ing rate for manual
demining in that area. In this contract,
we also did some work using a Casspir
moun ted metal detector array. It proved
very successful.
Based on a clea rance comparison
done on a 20,000 square merer (two beer- .
are) piece of rhe mine fields between rhe .
three-meter-wide detector array on rhe
Casspir and our manual deminers using
hand held detectors, the array managed
to work 100 times fas ter, yet it still fou nd
all the AP mines that rhe deminers could
find. The mines lifted were a mixture that
included PMN, PMN2 and P MD6
mines. These are all low metal content
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While dearming a SPM limpet mine a full
bomb suit, helmet and visor is being worn.
These are all capable of stopping the shrapnel
from a PROM1 mine.

AP mines. An important observation that
came our of this rest was done whi le we
were weighing and inspecting every piece
of metal the hand-held detectors were signalling. We noticed that most of the false
signals were pieces of shrapnel and metal
junk like wire and borde tops that were
either on top or in the first I Omm of soil.
The array had been modified to ignore
such small surface signals bur to still find
a PM N2 on rhe surface. This was the key
advantage of the array.

Comments:
•

A Mine Detecting
Dog looking for
mines in a road in
Angola.

• The manual deminers worked behind the array, and they uncovered an
additional I ,640 metal signa ls not
marked by the array. The 30 AP mines it

did mark were the only mines they could
find in the two hectare sire, however.
• The array did mark a further I 07
pieces of metal. Therefore, the array
marked 15 rimes less false alarms than
rhe hand detectors wirhour missing the
mines. So it was much more selective than
the hand detectors.
• In light of rhe Database of
Demining Incident Victims (DDJV)
facts about how manual deminers miss
at least three percent of mines, it would
have been interesting to have had the array behind the deminers. We may have

had a shocki ng result for the deminers!
• Arrays have their coils overlapping
and cannot leave unchecked spots, something it is suspected manual deminers can
easily do.
• The test was done on a mine field
that had irs vegetation run flar and made
foot safe by Casspirs. The mines Found
were nonfunctional, probably due to moisture ingression destroying their deronarors.

Comparative Efficiency
Among Commercial,
Military and NGO
Clearance Teams
There really needs to be no choice
favoring any of rhe groups on efficiency,

unless financial consrraincs affect a bias.
The way commercial contracts are presendy structured, commercial compa nies
are at a disadvantage. The size of the co ntracts is simply too small to allow the use
of expensive technologies to give them
an advantage. Militaries can use such
technologies and only pay operating
costs. Let me illustrate this with figures
our of our com pany's experience.
In the period 1991 to 1996, we did
11 contracts at an average contract size
of just over $1.5 m illion per contract.
Three contracts were over $2.5 million,
•
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allowing the use of technology and th reefold increases for price and speed. During the period from then until the end of
2000, we did 28 contracts for which rhe
average contract price was slightly less
rhan $400,000, and there was only one
proper contract ($2.7million in 1998) in
which we could use rhe technology effectively. This was the third example already given above.
The succession of small contracts
where high capital in vestment and mobilization cost made rhe Casspirs stay
away virtually turned our group into a
dog training company. The REST experience fortunately has given us additional
knowledge in the training and use of normal MODs. T his contract size problem
ca n be seen as one of the main reasons
that the R&D component of our group
has been moved into the South African
government's R&D organization , the
CSIR. R&D simply cannot be supported
or properly used in these small demining
contracts. The situation can be likened
to a road building company rrying to use
its graders and dozers to compete for the
repai r of suburban side walk contracts.
If any one group must bear the
blame for retarding technology in HD ir
musr be those responsible for fragmenting donor monies inro these small packages. This really leaves demining technology in the hands of the military. The
military has the further advantage of gen erally assembling the best equipment,
even if it is quire expensive. NGOs that
have visionary management and strong
financial support may become the technology leaders in HD. As for the commercial com panies, in my opinion they
have no hope of competing, as long as
the prescriptive nature and size of the contracts remains small as they are at present.
The companies are then forced into using manual demining and MODs, instead of the technologies that have in fact
already proven to be more cost effective,
faster and safer. So in the end, it will probably have to be the military, which is accused of causing the problem in the first
place, that will have to provide the fin al
solution to the problem.

Is "Donor Fatigue" a
Reality? If So, How Do We
Fix it?
( The following section comes from a
paper I wrote entitled Why Do R&D?)
Fro m 1997 onwards, rhe aid money
was always split down into such small
pieces that technology-based techniques
could nor be used. fr is my opinion that
this was done to favor manual dem ining
in the false belief that it would make area
clearance cheaper. What in fact happened
was that manual demining made area
clearance a lor slower and in fact twice as
expensive. This in turn drove the donors
away because they were not getting value
for their money, and they also saw no end
to the problem in any of the contaminated countries. Humanitarian Mine
Clearance (HMC) was seen as a bottomless p it into which money needed ro be
pou red for another century or two before the problem was solved! Today everybody wonders about so-called donor
fatigue. Even worse, the clearance efficiency
of manual demining is now being severely
challenged-another shock for the donors.
Instead of H MC, I predict rhar
Commercial Clearance Contracts linked
to m uch larger financial projects would

serve ro bring high-technology techniques
back into Mine Clearance (MC), so we
should concentrate on these techniques.
Apart from having a larger funding profile, such contracts are run by engineering principles where speed and efficiency
are insisted on and properly measured. I
am thinking of contracts for building
dams and roads, laying pipelines and repairing railways that have mine clearance
requirements.
In this context, there has been a recent incident where a su rvey technique
regularly used in a HMC context was
used in a survey done by the demining
company contracted to do the survey.
There was a fa tal explosion in an area
declared cl ean. This let the com pany doing a critical construction contract down.
Talk has it that the company involved in
the survey will nor be used again-the
possible financial losses to the larger co ntract due to doing the survey unscienrifically will not allow it. The same problem
can also exist in the clearance operations.
Whether the above is true or false,
we observed this behavior in 1994 when
we were contracted to redo clearance on
th ree so-called cleared roads done by
manual demining. We found quire a few
additional mines left behind besides the
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Manual deminers
checking the vehicle array
paint marks and
reclearing the whole two
hectare mine field.

ones that had ini tia ll y upset the road
builders. Men simpl y pur down their
tools when their bulldozer finds AT mines
in locations that the MAC had declared
safe. Obviously, when this type of resultoriented MC becomes rhe order of the
day, then technology and irs R&D component beco m es more important and
more viable. So I put a priority on R&D . .

Conclusion
The management of HD must reflect on rhe fact rhar rhe esrabl ished techniques they are now supporting as the way
to solve the big problem are too slow, nor
cost effective and causing roo many casualties. Only when they have successfully
addressed these problems will the donor
f:·uigue and other growing problems be
solved. Finally, everybody must get much
more serious about getting the appropriate technologies inro the field.•
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